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Rebranding Death 
Angela Wentz Faulconer 
In this paper, I will argue that efforts to legalize aid-in-dying or 
physician-assisted suicide are attempts to rebrand this sort of death as 
a good choice. It is common to justify physician-assisted suicide 
through arguments for a) relieving suffering or b) allowing individual 
autonomy, but I will show that the problem with these justifications 
is that once this type of death is judged as acceptable, it is difficult to 
justify limiting it to a narrow group such as the mentally competent, 
communicatively able, terminally ill adults designated by these legali-
zation bills. Ultimately, we must either label many more deaths as 
good deaths, destigmatizing suicide, or we must reject the notion that 
death at the time we choose is acceptable. I will argue for the latter. 
It is difficult to find neutral language to avoid prejudging the 
questions I want to explore in this paper: Is assisted dying suicide? Is 
physician-assisted suicide a good death? Is it something that should 
be approved and sanctioned, possibly even encouraged by the State? 
In an attempt to start from more neutral ground, and not to assume 
the conclusions I will argue for, I will discuss what I will call death at 
a time of one’s choosing (DTOC) instead of physician-assisted sui-
cide or aid-in-dying. 
I. DEATH WITH DIGNITY BILLS GIVE THE STATE’S 
IMPRIMATUR TO THE CHOICE TO END ONE’S LIFE BEFORE 
LIFE’S END 
At the outset, it is important to acknowledge what motivates the 
death with dignity movement, the movement that champions death at 
a time of one’s choosing. Many people fear death. Dying in pain has 
always been feared and new life-sustaining technologies now aggra-
vate these fears as some of the people who would have died in the 
past are now maintained alive, but without being healed, without be-
ing returned to health,1 without being returned to even a semblance 
 
 1. John Lachs, When Abstract Moralizing Runs Amok, in INTERVENTION AND 
REFLECTION 601, 602 (Ronald Munson ed., 2012). John D. Arras, Physician-Assisted Suicide: 
A Tragic View, in PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE: EXPANDING THE DEBATE (Margaret P. Bat-
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of well-being.2 We dread finding ourselves ready to die, yet still be-
ing alive. We have seen others buy—through treatments such as 
chemotherapy, artificial ventilators, or difficult surgeries—a few 
more days or weeks, but at a cost that seems terrible to pay. We are 
afraid of suffering.3 We are also afraid of not being able to care for 
ourselves; we worry about dependence and embarrassment.4 We wor-
ry about a return to childhood, or worse, infancy.5 We worry about 
humiliation, and we fear a death without dignity. 
 
tin, Rosamond Rhode & Anita Silvers eds., 1998) [hereinafter PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE]. 
 2. Most of us now believe that it is our right to refuse undesired life-sustaining 
measures (I owe thanks to Gert, Culver and Clouser for their helpful “refuse” v. “request” ter-
minology). Bernard Gert, Charles M. Culver & K. Danner Clouser, An Alternative to Physi-
cian-Assisted Suicide, in PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE, supra note 1, at 186. If we do not want 
our lives prolonged through artificial resuscitation or a mechanical ventilator or if we choose to 
forego chemotherapy, we have the right to refuse these treatments. Refusing medical treatment 
is not an example of what I call death at a time of one’s choosing. Instead, this term describes 
the result of requests for interventions to end one’s life. Some proponents of euthanasia, such as 
James Rachels, have argued that refusing medical treatment to prolong life is morally equivalent 
to a physician’s intervention to end life, and sometimes even morally preferable. James Rachels, 
Active and Passive Euthanasia, in INTERVENTION AND REFLECTION 585, 586 (Ronald Mun-
son ed., 2012). 
However, for most people it is common sense that refusing life-sustaining measures is 
different from requesting that action be taken to end one’s life. Daniel Callahan, When Self-
Determination Runs Amok, in INTERVENTION AND REFLECTION, supra note 1, at 598. Refus-
ing recommended surgery or chemotherapy is not the same sort of action and does not neces-
sarily have the same intent as requesting administration of a lethal injection. Id.  
The freedom to refuse life-sustaining measures may seem irrelevant to a discussion of 
DTOC. However, it is relevant here because of the widely shared fear of being kept alive by 
machines past the time a person wishes to resist dying. This fear often leads people to believe 
that legalizing DTOC is imperative because it would allow one to refuse undesired life-
sustaining measures. However, this is mistaken. Legalizing DTOC for this reason is unneces-
sary because the debate about whether patients or their agents should be allowed to refuse med-
ical treatment has already been settled. See Matter of Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). 
It is already legal, and most of us would argue that it is also clearly moral, to allow patients to 
refuse life-sustaining technologies or to have them withdrawn. Every competent person already 
has that freedom, so this is not a reason for legalizing DTOC.  
 3. Arras, supra note 1, at 282. 
 4. Paul C. McLean, Medical Ethics: Incontinence A Fate Worse than Death? Really?, 
WBUR CommonHealth, (September 9, 2016), http://www.wbur.org/commonhealth/ 
2016/09/09/incontinence-fate-death. 
 5. See Emily B. Rubin, Anna E. Buehler & Scott D. Halpern, States Worse Than 
Death Among Hospitalized Patients with Serious Illnesses, 176 JAMA INTERNAL MED 10, 
1557 (2016). It is difficult to deal with these fears rationally. A widely-reported recent study of 
adults age 60 and over and hospitalized with serious illnesses suggested that almost seventy per-
cent considered incontinence as a state the same as or worse than death. Id. One wonders what 
the approximately thirteen million incontinent Americans would say about this verdict. Fifty 
percent of elderly adults are incontinent. Illinois Dep’t of Public Health, Incontinence, 
http://www.dph.illinois.gov/topics-services/diseases-and-conditions/diseases-a-z-list/ 
incontinence (last visited Apr. 13, 2017). Are they really better off dead? 
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The death with dignity movement suggests a solution to our fears 
through the control offered by a lethal prescription. Up until now, 
such prescriptions have not been legal. Prescriptions and medical 
practices are carefully regulated by the State.6 Up until now, the State 
has not offered us control over when we die. Except in death penalty 
cases, the State has not taken this control for itself either. This lack of 
control over aspects of one’s own life is hard for some to accept. Be-
ing autonomous is a priority for many. In a study of what motivated 
patients in Oregon to request Physician-Assisted Dying/Physician-
Assisted Suicide, Ganzini, Goy and Dobscha found that patients were 
“more strongly motivated by the prospect of loss of autonomy,” by 
the desire for control, than by current physical symptoms.7 
Traditionally, taking control we would not otherwise have over 
our own lives, taking affirmative steps to avoid suffering or the fear of 
suffering, has been understood as a form of suicide. There has been a 
significant stigma against it. Part of this has been religious. Suicide 
has been seen as a wrongful death, a sin. Historically, many who 
committed suicide were restricted from burial in church plots.8 Part 
of this has been social. Families have been ashamed and have hidden 
suicide, seeing it as the failure of themselves or their loved one, keep-
ing it out of obituaries and sometimes even out of intra-family con-
versation.9 Fortunately, as society has grown to understand more 
about mental illness, suicide has come to be talked about more openly 
and has lost some of its former stigma. We have come to feel more 
compassion towards the suffering that leads to these choices.10   
Nonetheless, it is fair to say that suicide is still seen as a bad 
death, as something we would encourage those we love and those we 
barely know to avoid, as something that you should not do to your 
family. Suicide is secret. Although some do make pleas for help, in 
 
 6. Lachs, supra note 1, at 602. 
 7. Linda Ganzini, Elizabeth R. Goy & Steven K. Dobscha, Oregonians’ Reasons for 
Requesting Physician Aid in Dying, 169 ARCH INTERN MED 5, 489, 491 (2009). 
 8. Reverend Mike Parsons, General Synod Private Member’s Motion: Canon B 38 
Canon law in relation to the funerals of those who have taken their own life, Church of Eng-
land (2015), https://www.churchofengland.org/media/2141151/gs%201972a%20-
%20pmm%20on%20canon%20b%2038.pdf. 
 9. Mark E. Hastings, Lisa M. Northman & June P. Tangney, Shame, Guilt, and Sui-
cide, in SUICIDE SCIENCE: EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES, 67 (Thomas Joiner & M. David 
Rudd eds., 2002). 
 10. Reverend Mike Parsons, Why the church should change laws on allowing suicide 
victims proper funerals, Gloucestershire Live (Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.gloucestershirelive 
.co.uk/church-change-laws-allowing-suicide-victims/story-26021685-detail/story.html.  
FAULCONER.MACRO.3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/31/2017  5:06 PM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 31 
316 
general the desire to end one’s life is not something one can talk 
about openly, not just because of others’ disapproval, but because of 
interference from the law.11 To avoid being hospitalized, one must 
keep quiet. Suicide is also messy. The methods available (death by 
handgun, cutting an artery, hanging, or overdosing) are often unde-
sirable,12 likely because they are dramatic, violent, painful, and/or not 
always successful. Against this context, many are tempted to see legal-
ization of death at a time of one’s choosing as a solution—at least for 
those who qualify under the strict restrictions thought necessary in 
these bills—adults who are mentally competent, communicatively 
able, and terminally ill.13   
Proponents see DTOC as a solution (both to loss of control and 
fears about death and to the difficulties of suicide) because legalizing 
DTOC means that the State steps in and gives permission to end 
one’s life before it ends naturally—a) ending the fear of pain and/or 
loss of dignity and b) suggesting that the State sanctions one’s choice. 
Through these bills, the State says, “You can end your life early. You 
can end it now. There doesn’t have to be a stigma. We will call it a 
good death.” Speaking in the voice of the State to call it a good death 
might seem like a stretch, but consider that the Oregon Death with 
Dignity Act (upon which the other states’ bills are modeled) uses the 
phrase “humane and dignified” eighteen times to describe death by 
lethal prescription.14 In this context, the restrictions put in place by 
bills that legalize DTOC not only make DTOC more acceptable to 
the public, they also make DTOC seem more acceptable for those 
who would consider choosing it, because death becomes something 
that one can qualify for, something that one can merit or not, based 
on one’s condition. When legalized, this sort of death gains the im-
primatur of the State, the State’s seal of approval. 
According to the State, if one meets a certain standard, reaches a 
certain age, is dying in a certain way (because only some conditions 
make a six months-until-death type prediction possible), is approved 
by two physicians, and jumps through the proper bureaucratic hoops, 
 
 11. E. Fuller Torrey & Mary Zdanowicz, Outpatient Commitment: What, Why, and for 
Whom, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERV. 3, 337 (2001). 
 12. Lachs, supra note 1, at 602. 
 13. H.B. 264, 2016 Gen. Sess., (Utah 2016); S.B. 128, 2015-2016 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Cal. 2015). 
 14. Oregon Health Authority, Death with Dignity Act, OREGON.GOV, 
https://public.health.oregon.gov/ProviderPartnerResources/Evaluationresearch/deathwithdigni
tyact/Pages/index.aspx (last visited Jan. 21, 2017). 
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this “qualifies” one for DTOC. Death need no longer be secret nor 
messy. One need not disappoint one’s friends and family. There need 
not be shame. The person in this situation can comfort herself with 
the reflection that she has been approved by the State for what is 
stipulated to be a humane and dignified death. The State agrees that, 
given her condition, she should have (as labeled by the law passed in 
California this past summer) an “end of life option.”15 She now has 
State sanctioned control over her own life and death. 
This control extends even to the death certificate. According to 
the California Medical Association, when a lethal prescription is in-
gested, “Physicians can list the cause of death that they feel is most 
accurate,” but under the law “physicians cannot list ‘suicide’” as that 
cause.16 The State also tells insurance companies how they are to un-
derstand these deaths: companies are barred from treating a patient’s 
“life, health or annuity policies any differently than death by natural 
causes.”17  The legalization of death at a time of one’s choosing is a 
rebranding of death. What had been the bad, societally unacceptable 
death of suicide is mandated by law to be labeled as the good, socie-
tally acceptable death of ingesting a lethal prescription under physi-
cian’s orders and with state law presiding. 
It is curious that advocates of DTOC resist labeling this practice 
as suicide.18 This is surprising given that the most compelling reason 
for DTOC is to give a patient control of when she dies.19 The term 
“suicide” suggests that someone has taken that kind of control in 
choosing to end her own life. If having control over when one dies is 
a good thing, why should suicide be considered a bad thing? The rea-
son is that although we may not wish to judge any specific individual 
who chooses to take her own life, as a society, it is still our sense that 
suicide is not acceptable—it is dying done the wrong way. Stepping 
back from the specific example of terminal illness, we do not general-
ly consider pain, depression, or desire to be in control of when one 
dies as good reasons for ending one’s life, and this is why we treat the 
desire to kill oneself as a crisis—regardless of the reasons that seem to 
 
 15. S.B. 128, 2015-2016 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015). 
 16. Claudia Buck, Eight things you should know as California’s new aid in dying law 
takes effect, THE SACRAMENTO BEE, (June 9, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.sacbee.com 
/news/local/health-and-medicine/article82660497.html. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Robert Steinbrook, Physician-Assisted Death—From Oregon to Washington State, 
359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 24, 2513 (2008). 
 19. Ganzini, supra note 7, at 489. 
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justify it in the view of the individual who considers taking that step.20   
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DEATH AT A TIME OF ONE’S 
CHOOSING 
In what follows, I will look at two possible justifications for legal-
izing death at a time of one’s choosing and show that both justifica-
tions share a common problem: they justify too much. Regardless of 
whether we justify DTOC as a response to terrible suffering or if we 
justify it through an appeal to autonomy, the problem is that we end 
up justifying DTOC for everyone, not just those who can reasonably 
be thought to have less than six months to live. Let’s look at DTOC 
as a response to suffering first. The argument is straightforward: 
DTOC is justified because some people suffer so terribly, so unbear-
ably, that the merciful thing to do is to allow DTOC so that they 
need not bear the unbearable any longer. 
Unfortunately, there are some important problems with focusing 
on suffering as a justification for legalizing death at a time of one’s 
choosing. First, suffering is subjective: what may be tolerable to one 
person may be unbearable to another. Who is to judge another’s suf-
fering? Second, physical suffering is not the only form of suffering 
and may not be the worst, and third, the terminally ill do not have a 
monopoly on suffering, nor do the competent. 
A. Suffering is Subjective 
One problem with understanding suffering as the justification for 
legalizing DTOC is a practical one. Because suffering is subjective, it 
is difficult to apply as a criterion. Who is to be included and exclud-
ed? Arras and Callahan also make this point.21 We all know people 
who take to their beds, unable to function at the first sign of illness, 
and others who are able to function even under serious illness with 
little apparent impact to their daily activities. The suffering that one 
person can tolerate, others will find difficult to bear.22  
Some might look to medical professionals in hopes of finding a 
more objective basis for evaluating a patient’s suffering. However, the 
yellow pain scale evaluation cards that dangle from every hospital ex-
 
 20. National Suicide Prevention Lifeline, http://suicidepreventionlifeline.org/ (last visit-
ed Apr. 8, 2017). 
 21. Arras, supra note 1, at 597. 
 22. Id. 
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am room testify that these hopes are misplaced. While the nurse may 
help her patient interpret the zero to ten pain scale, it is the patient’s 
answers that determine the medicine ultimately prescribed.  
 Suffering’s subjectivity means that it is impossible for the State to 
rank suffering from worst to least or to draw a line that designates the 
point below which suffering must be endured and above which 
DTOC ought to be offered as an option. This means that we must 
either legislate the impossible by drawing lines that are not just unfair 
but absurd, or allow each individual to decide when her own suffering 
is sufficient—effectively opening the choice to end one’s life on the 
basis of suffering to everyone who suffers, which is to say, everyone.  
 
B. Physical Suffering Is Not the Only Suffering 
Another problem with justifying death at a time of one’s choosing 
through suffering is that physical suffering is not the only (or neces-
sarily even the worst) type of suffering. Like physical suffering, men-
tal suffering too, can be hard to heal from. It too can leave us unable 
to pursue the activities we once enjoyed.23 Mental suffering too can 
make life feel not worth living.24 It can feel unbearable. If we seek to 
relieve those who suffer, then if physical suffering is a justification for 
DTOC, mental suffering ought to be as well. Again though, the 
problem is that this opens the option of DTOC to almost everyone. 
C. The Terminally Ill and the Competent Do Not Have a Monopoly 
on Suffering 
Finally, note that the terminally ill and the competent do not 
have a monopoly on suffering. One does not need to be terminally ill 
to suffer. Bills to legalize DTOC contain many safeguards that limit 
it to a narrow category of people (mentally competent adults, able to 
communicate, terminally ill and within six months of death, etc.).25 
Although these safeguards may make us more comfortable with the 
bills because they restrict their scope, they undermine the bills’ log-
 
 23. Mayo Clinic Staff, Diseases and Conditions: Depression (major depressive disorder): 
Symptoms, Mayo Clinic, http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/depression/basics/ 
symptoms/con-20032977 (last visited Jan. 21, 2017). 
 24. Id. 
 25. S.B. 128, supra note 15; H.B. 264, supra note 13. 
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ic.26 If end-of-life suffering justifies legalizing DTOC, it makes sense 
that profound middle or beginning-of-life suffering should justify 
DTOC as well. If suffering is what makes choosing death acceptable, 
then one’s life expectancy ought to be irrelevant.27   
This is not all—just as there are many that suffer who are not 
terminally ill—there are many who suffer who are not cognitively 
competent.28 Unfortunately, terrible suffering is not limited only to 
those from whom we can secure consent. If suffering alone were rea-
son to condone DTOC, then suffering might also be reason enough 
to condone ending the lives of children who are suffering (but who 
have not reached the age of majority) as has happened in Belgium,29 
or to end the lives of Alzheimer’s patients who are suffering but men-
tally incompetent. However, most of us find these conclusions unac-
ceptable. If this is what prioritizing suffering means, these arguments 
suggest a problem with our priorities. We do not sanction juvenile 
and incompetent adult euthanasia because we do not see suffering 
alone as sufficient for sanctioning death.  
There are several problems with justifying the legalization of 
DTOC as a response to suffering. The main point is that human suf-
fering is vast and sufferers are legion. If terrible suffering by itself suf-
ficed to justify DTOC, then DTOC would need to be offered as an 
option to many. However, as a society, we reject this idea. When a 
young person undergoes surgery and doctors struggle to get his pain 
under control afterwards, no one would see ending his life as an op-
tion he ought to be offered. When people suffer from painful, debili-
tating chronic (as opposed to terminal) illnesses for which there is no 
cure, we do not see ending such a person’s life as the appropriate 
course. The reason DTOC bills tend to be heavily restricted—for ex-
ample, to specific classes of sufferers (aged to adulthood and compe-
tent) or to people under certain circumstances or suffering from cer-
tain conditions (within six months of death, those suffering from ALS 
but not those from Alzheimer’s, for example)—is because in fact most 
of us do not see suffering by itself as reason for ending someone’s life. 
Suffering alone does not condone DTOC. 
 
 26. Daniel Callahan, When Self-Determination Runs Amok, in INTERVENTION AND 
REFLECTION, supra note 2, at 599; Arras, supra note 1, at 283. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Callahan, supra note 2 at 600; Daniel Callahan, Ad Hominem Run Amok: A Re-
sponse to John Lachs, 5 J. OF CLINICAL ETHICS, no. 1, 1994, at 14. 
 29. See Rory Watson, Belgium Extends Euthanasia Law to Children, BRITISH MED. J. 
at 348 (2014). 
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But if suffering alone does not provide justification for DTOC, 
what does? The other main argument for State sanction of DTOC is 
from individual control or autonomy. It is worth noting that the ex-
perience of Oregon (where DTOC has now been legal for almost 
twenty years) suggests that most people who request life-ending pre-
scriptions do so not because of current and unbearable suffering, but 
because they hope to control when and how they die.30   
The argument from individual control, or autonomy, fits nicely 
with the justifications based on suffering that were insufficient on 
their own. Why would it be the appropriate province of the State (or 
anyone else) to decide who has suffered more, which type of suffering 
is more difficult, or when suffering justifies death? Because the indi-
vidual is the one who must live with the suffering or have his life end-
ed, the individual is the one who should have control, the one who 
should have the final say over whether death is the right choice for 
him or not. This argument suggests that the individual must have au-
tonomy over his own life, including when and how he dies. Rather 
than prioritizing suffering, this view prioritizes autonomy. 
John Stuart Mill advocates for this view of autonomy in On Lib-
erty.31   Because he has two views about autonomy and its relationship 
with the State which may or may not be consistent with each other, I 
will distinguish them by calling the first view autonomy1 and the sec-
ond view autonomy2. In arguing for autonomy1 he explains that indi-
vidual autonomy must be prioritized because it is “[t]he only freedom 
which deserves the name . . . that of pursuing our own good in our 
own way.”32 If a person believes that his own best good is to end his 
life, it appears Mill would support such a choice because “over him-
self, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.”33 The 
State has no license to interfere with his sovereignty, the individual’s 
control over his own body and mind, unless there is a “harm to oth-
ers.”34  Mill says we cannot interfere with a person even if we think in 
exerting this control over his own life (and one assumes, death) he is 
harming himself, for his “own good, either physical or moral, is not a 
sufficient warrant.”35   
 
 30. Ganzini, supra note 7, at 491. 
 31. See generally, JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1863). 
 32. Id. at 29. 
 33. Id. at 23. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
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III. DIFFICULTIES WITH JUSTIFYING DTOC THROUGH 
ARGUMENTS FOR AUTONOMY 
The idea that we should acknowledge and respect the autonomy 
that every competent individual rightly has over her own life and af-
fairs is a powerful justification for legalizing death at a time of one’s 
choosing. However, I will argue that there are three autonomy-
related considerations that suggest we must not legalize DTOC: 1) 
allowing individuals to alienate their autonomy betrays the purposes 
of autonomy, 2) prioritizing autonomy has unacceptable consequenc-
es, and finally, 3) labeling this use of autonomy as a good death harms 
those with disabilities and chronic pain. 
A. Allowing Individuals to Alienate their Autonomy Betrays the 
Purposes of Autonomy 
The first autonomy-related reason for not legalizing DTOC is 
that allowing someone to alienate her autonomy betrays the purposes 
for which the State grants autonomy. John Stuart Mill is famous for 
his autonomy1 view which suggests that the only reason for interfer-
ing with another person’s autonomy is to prevent harm to others.36 
However, as both Gerald Dworkin and Craig Carr have pointed out, 
a careful reading of On Liberty raises another reason for interfering 
with autonomy.37 This is the view I will call autonomy2. In discussing 
whether someone should be able to sell himself into slavery, Mill ex-
plains that “the reason for not interfering, unless for the sake of oth-
ers, with a person’s voluntary acts, is consideration for his liberty.”38   
Someone who sells himself into slavery “defeats, in his own case, the 
very purpose which is the justification of allowing him to dispose of 
himself . . . The principle of freedom cannot require that he should 
be free not to be free. It is not freedom, to be allowed to alienate his 
freedom.”39    
On this view, the State gives freedom not for freedom’s sake, but 
for freedom’s fruits. Autonomy is desirable because it allows a com-
petent adult to choose her own life plan, not just because she knows 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in INTERVENTION AND REFLECTION, supra note 1, 
at 65; CRAIG L. CARR, POLITY: POLITICAL CULTURE AND THE NATURE OF POLITICS 81 
(2007). 
 38. MILL, supra note 31, at 198. 
 39. Id. at 198–99.  
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better than others what pursuing her good looks like, but also be-
cause what she has chosen is the good because it is what she has cho-
sen for herself (this is also characteristic of Mill’s autonomy1).  
One need not accept every detail of Mill’s conception of the good 
to agree that autonomy is valuable and that, as autonomy2 suggests, 
the State has an important role in protecting it. Fortunately, most 
people guard their autonomy jealously and resist threats to it. How-
ever, in situations of desperation, people sometimes do give up their 
autonomy. An individual who seeks to commit herself to permanent 
servitude in order to secure some gain for a family member is an ex-
ample of a person who seeks to alienate her autonomy. Mill’s auton-
omy2 suggests that it is the role of the State to step in to protect her. 
Another example of someone seeking to alienate her autonomy is the 
individual who seeks to end her own life. When life ends, autonomy 
ends. Thus, rather than promoting DTOC, the State should step in 
to protect patients.  
One might argue that it is not right for the State to interfere with 
the autonomy of the terminally ill by prohibiting medical profession-
als from helping those who seek to end their lives. After all, the case 
in which a terminally ill person ends his life is different than the case 
in which someone else ends his life. A person who is not terminally ill 
may have years of decisions and opportunities for self-direction ahead 
of him if he does not end his life early. A person who is terminally ill 
does not have this—regardless of whether he acts or asks others to act 
to end his life. One might conclude that when a terminally ill person 
ends his life there is less impact to autonomy and, therefore, less rea-
son for the State or anyone else to interfere. 
But this is not a wholly satisfactory response. Although terminal 
patients are dying, they are not dead. Even with a vastly reduced slate 
of choices, there are still choices to be made. It is true that the termi-
nal patient cannot implement a plan of life and hope to realize his 
conception of the good over the next twenty years. But for those who 
value autonomy, it is worth recognizing that the terminal individual 
does have decisions to make about his last few days and months. How 
will he react to his own predicament? With anticipation? Anger? Si-
lence? Tears? Will he dissolve into self-pity or shake his fist at the 
universe? Or look forward to peace at last? What will his last interac-
tions with friends and family be? Will he leave words of wisdom or 
memories of amusing eccentricity? Will he express gratitude for 
medical workers or complain? Perhaps both? Will he live out his own 
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conception of the good in the months he has left, abandon it, or re-
forge something new? 
Many see one’s last days as especially important. Of course, peo-
ple who choose to end their lives early also have last days. One can 
argue that when a terminally ill patient chooses an earlier death he 
makes a final and important use of his autonomy. One could argue 
that in doing so, he exercises his autonomy rather than alienating it. 
Consider the case of Brittany Maynard.40 Maynard was the twenty-
nine year old woman credited with shifting public opinion in Califor-
nia and across the nation when she released videos explaining her de-
cision to end her life after her terminal cancer diagnosis in 2014. In 
the videos, Maynard argued that she did not want to die, she wanted 
to live.41 However, because the doctors could not help her to live, she 
wanted them to help her to die on her own terms.42 One could argue 
that Maynard made a final and important use of her autonomy by 
choosing to seek help in ending her life at a time of her choosing. 
Through these final choices she lived out her conception of the good, 
a good in which living with and dying from brain cancer had no part.  
One can make the same argument about a woman who sells her-
self into slavery. She, too, makes a final and important use of her au-
tonomy by deciding that she can best live out her conception of the 
good by sacrificing her freedom to help a family member. We can 
best understand Mill’s comments on selling oneself into slavery not 
to mean that such a decision does not count as an exercise of auton-
omy—it seems obvious that it is—but instead as an exercise of auton-
omy that the State should not allow, because the State’s role is to fos-
ter autonomy and to oppose practices that end or reduce it. 
Though many look to Mill’s autonomy1 as reason to legalize 
death at a time of one’s choosing, Mill’s autonomy2 provides us with 
an understanding of why we should oppose legalization of DTOC. 
Allowing individuals to alienate their autonomy betrays the State’s 
purpose for granting autonomy. The State should not promote this 
by rebranding death. 
 
 40. CBS News, Brittany Maynard Doesn’t “Want to Die”, CBS NEWS, (Oct. 14, 2014, 
7:00 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/brittany-maynard-dying-with-dignity-before-cancer-
takes-her-life/. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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B. Prioritizing Autonomy Has Unacceptable Consequences 
Craig Carr calls the tension in Mill’s autonomy1 and autonomy2 
the “freedom paradox”.43 Because choices (death at a time of one’s 
choosing is an example) often “close the doors to alternative possibili-
ties . . . it is difficult to distinguish between the exercise of autonomy 
and its alienation.”44   He suggests that it is inconsistent for Mill and 
others like him to call for the State to interfere with the autonomy of 
individuals who threaten to alienate their own autonomy. The prob-
lem is that prohibiting someone from alienating his autonomy re-
quires limiting that autonomy.45 How can the State maximize auton-
omy as Mill desires and limit autonomy at the same time? Even if this 
is consistent, is it desirable? To what degree should autonomy be pri-
oritized? 
Mill’s arguments for individual autonomy and control are appeal-
ing because the type of unfettered freedom he describes is something 
we desire from the time we are two-year-olds. His suggestion that 
each of us understands better than anyone else what form our own 
happiness takes is intuitively appealing. However, we must be cau-
tious about what it means to prioritize individual autonomy. If we fo-
cus on autonomy1 which means not taking Mill’s selling-oneself-into-
slavery passage into account (because it is unclear how much State 
regulation Mill is calling for and how much he is willing to accept), 
Mill appears to advocate for a society different and far more hands off 
than our own. Contra Mill, our State does sometimes interfere with 
the liberty of its citizens for their own good. For example, Gerald 
Dworkin points out that we do not allow dueling.46 We restrict gam-
bling.47   We cap loan interest rates and do not allow certain types of 
contracts.48   Additionally, we will not let regular people self-diagnose 
their own strep throats and start taking penicillin.  Blood pressure 
medication is not available over the counter. In addition, up to this 
point, we have also not allowed citizens to choose to end their lives 
(apart from the small number of states that have become exceptions).  
If, as Mill’s autonomy1 suggests, autonomy is our most important 
 
 43. CARR, supra note 37, at 81. 
 44. Id. at 82 
 45. Id. at 81. 
 46. Dworkin, supra note 37, at 61. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. Note that several of these restrictions might be consistent with Mill’s autonomy2 
if they are understood as attempts to discourage individuals from alienating their autonomy.  
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consideration, then rebranding DTOC makes sense because rebrand-
ing all suicide makes sense. Not limiting the individual’s autonomy 
means allowing suicidal friends to decide for themselves whether life 
is worth living. On this view, it is inappropriate to interfere with 
someone else’s decision that it is the right time for his life to end. On 
Mill’s view it is acceptable to remonstrate, reason with, and seek to 
persuade one’s friend, but it is not acceptable to compel him or to 
physically prevent him from carrying out his intent if it does not 
harm others.49 On Mill’s autonomy1 view, when the State legalizes 
medical assistance in ending a life, this is a way of supporting person-
al autonomy. Ultimately, if allowing individuals their autonomy is the 
most important thing, then the question of how or how much those 
individuals suffer is irrelevant as is the question of whether the person 
is terminally ill.50 When autonomy is the preeminent consideration, 
what matters is whether an individual has made the decision to end 
his life and whether he has the will to carry that decision out. 
For many of us, the idea that we cannot interfere with a friend’s 
intent to take his own life functions as a reductio ad absurdum to the 
idea that we should prioritize individual autonomy above everything 
else. Making autonomy the preeminent consideration results in unac-
ceptable consequences. When someone expresses interest in ending 
his own life, we beg and we plead, but we do not stop there. We call 
on the police or the hospital or anyone who might successfully inter-
cede. Under the most exigent circumstances, we are willing to involve 
the hospital and the police because we believe, contra Mill, that coer-
cion, not just persuasion, is appropriate. If prioritizing autonomy 
means that we should not do this, then we should not prioritize au-
tonomy. 
Mill’s autonomy1 arguments can be used to justify legalizing 
death at a time of one’s choosing. However, to reach this conclusion, 
one must bite a bullet. There is no reason to restrict the scope of 
Mill’s autonomy1 arguments to the terminally ill or even to the seri-
ously suffering. Employing Mill’s arguments for individual autono-
my, one justifies not just DTOC for someone who is already dying, 
but any competent adult’s decision to end her life because that seems 
right to her. On this view, suicide is acceptable regardless of one’s 
level of suffering or life-expectancy. Prioritizing autonomy means 
 
 49. MILL, supra note 31, at 23. 
 50. Arras, supra note 1 at 283. 
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that it is not the content of the choice or one’s reasons for choosing 
that is prioritized, but choice itself. For those who are willing to bite 
this bullet, if legalizing DTOC does not harm others, then it is diffi-
cult to offer reasons why it should not be legalized.  
C. Labeling DTOC a Good Death Harms Those with Disabilities 
and Chronic Pain. 
We are left with a final question: does State-sanctioned DTOC 
harm others? The answer is yes, by rebranding death in a way that 
harms the vulnerable in our community, particularly the dying and 
those with disabilities and chronic pain. This harm offers a basis for 
opposing bills that legalize DTOC, even for those who endorse 
Mill’s autonomy1.51 
We should reject rebranding death because of the harm labeling 
DTOC a good death does to the dying and those with disabilities. If 
DTOC is legalized, some people may be pressured or may feel pres-
sured to choose death when they are not yet ready to die. Legalizing 
DTOC means that not only the patient, but also her family, her doc-
tors, her hospital, her insurance company, and her neighbors all live 
under a regime where ending the patient’s life is an option that the 
State has officially sanctioned as acceptable, even “humane and digni-
fied.”52 This is cause for concern given that most of these parties 
would benefit in various ways from the patient’s earlier death.53  Rec-
ognizing that most people would never kill nor purposely pressure 
someone towards death, it is still disturbing to note that many of 
these incentives (not exclusively financial) run towards death. Cou-
pled with the State giving its seal of approval to an early death, this is 
problematic. 
Whether patients being pressured to die when not yet ready to 
choose death is an actual harm of legal DTOC rather than just a pos-
sible concern is a question perhaps best argued from an empirical 
perspective. We can look at what is actually happening in the Neth-
 
 51. For those who find the notion that they must not interfere (other than through per-
suasion) with a friend’s desire to end his life as a reductio of the notion that autonomy should 
be prioritized, the best arguments for legalizing DTOC (autonomy-based arguments) are al-
ready in doubt. This section simply offers additional reasons for opposing legalized DTOC.   
 52. Oregon Health Authority, supra note 14; H.B. 264, supra note 13. 
 53. Many of these ways are financial, but there are also the physical and time-related 
burdens of caregiving, the shame or frustration one might feel at being reminded of lingering 
patients one has been unable to cure, and the burden of feeling called upon to continue in com-
passion.  
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erlands,54 where death at a time of one’s choosing has long been legal, 
to determine an answer. Meanwhile, consider that choosing under 
pressure to end one’s life early is just one of DTOC’s possible harms. 
Another important harm is sustained by the person with disabili-
ties who may not choose death herself, but may have to live with her 
condition knowing that the State has decreed that death is an ac-
ceptable choice in conditions like hers. What is it like to be a person 
with ALS (Lou Gehrig’s disease) in Oregon? What is it like when the 
State tells you that your condition is so terrible that death is an ac-
ceptable option? In pushing for legalization, advocates of DTOC are 
requesting the State’s seal of approval to label this type of death as a 
good death, an acceptable choice. If the State gives its imprimatur, 
how could this not have an impact on the mindset of someone who is 
elderly, someone who suffers from terrible pain, or someone who 
must cope with a body that is not fully functional? 
The harms to people with disabilities are significant. William 
Peace is a paraplegic who became disabled at age eighteen and has 
been paralyzed for over thirty years. He argues for disability aware-
ness and against physician-assisted suicide at a blog he has named 
“Bad Cripple.”55 Consider his reaction to a 2013 New York Times 
article about end-of-life decisions.56 In the article, the author de-
scribed someone suffering from a serious disability. Peace later re-
flected: 
“The descriptions of Hopkins [sic] body are deeply offensive. 
The not so subtle sub text is that life with a disability, especially for a 
vent dependent quad, is filled with pain and suffering. . . . [T]o be 
 
 54. Are more deaths being approved through DTOC laws each year? Is death being of-
fered to an ever wider spectrum of people? A recent Newsweek article examined these trends in 
“Dying Dutch: Euthanasia Spreads Across Europe.” Winston Ross, Dying Dutch: Euthanasia 
Spreads Across Europe, NEWSWEEK (February 12, 2015, 7:46 AM), http://www. 
newsweek.com/2015/02/20/choosing-die-netherlands-euthanasia-debate-306223.html. Schol-
ars such as Daniel Callahan, Callahan, supra note 2, at 15, John Arras, Arras, supra note 1, at 
299, Peter Singer, Peter Singer, Voluntary Euthanasia: A Utilitarian Perspective, in 
INTERVENTION AND REFLECTION 605, 612 (Ronald Munson ed., 2012), and Mary Warnock 
and Elisabeth MacDonald, MARY WARNOCK & ELISABETH MACDONALD, EASEFUL DEATH, 
88 (2008), have long suggested that we look to the Netherlands as we attempt to answer these 
and similar questions. Callahan and Arras suggest that the answers to those questions caution 
against legalizing DTOC. Singer and Warnock and MacDonald disagree. Unfortunately, both 
the empirical research and the task of weighing competing interpretations of it are tasks that are 
beyond my scope here. 
 55. William Peace, The NYT Infuriates Me, BAD CRIPPLE (July 7, 2013, 1:09 PM), 
http://badcripple.blogspot.com/2013_07_14_archive.html. 
 56. Id.  
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rendered a quadriplegic is a fate worse than death. . . .”57 Peace goes 
on to explain the hurt from the way a person with a disability similar 
to his own was described: “a plugged-in mannequin in the I.C.U., the 
very embodiment of a right-to-die case study” to read of the man’s 
“useless body,” its “incessant needs” and then once again, the man’s 
“inert sack of a body. . . .”58 Peace does not think of himself that way. 
He has a life and a body that he values. The difficult thing for him 
and people like him is to live in an ableist culture that insists the bur-
den is continually on them to show that their lives are worth living, 
that they are of value.59   
One might argue against these considerations by noting that 
Peace is but one man. Not everyone similarly situated would be of-
fended. How many people are that severely disabled in any case? 
Those few unfortunate individuals must be contrasted with all those 
whose lives and deaths would be improved through legal DTOC. 
However, this way of pitting the numbers in each community against 
the other does not work. The first reason for that is that the commu-
nity of those with disabilities is not a small one and the number of 
those who would qualify for DTOC is not large. According to the 
CDC: 
A new report describing the percentage of adults with disabilities in 
the United States . . . is based on questions used for the first time in 
the 2013 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) that 
allow respondents to identify specific functional types of disability, 
such as mobility (serious difficulty walking or climbing stairs), cog-
nitive (serious difficulty concentrating, remembering or making de-
cisions), vision (serious difficulty seeing), self-care (difficulty dress-
ing or bathing) and independent living (difficulty doing errands 
alone).60 
According to this report, in 2013 over 53 million adults living in 
communities in the United States had a disability.61 That is 22% of 
adults in the United States.62 If this number seems inflated because 
minor disabilities are included, consider that if we included only 1 in 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Ctr. for Disease Control and Prevention, Key Findings: Prevalence of Disability and 
Disability Type Among Adults – United States, 2013, 64 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. 
REP. 777, No. 29 (July 31, 2015). 
 61. Id. at 781. 
 62. Id. at 779. 
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every 4 people identified as disabled in that study, the number would 
still be over 13 million adults. By contrast, the group that would be 
able to make use of DTOC laws like Oregon’s is smaller than one 
might suppose. Although the rate has tripled from the first years the 
law was in effect, only 155 prescriptions for lethal medication were 
written statewide in Oregon in 2014—the latest year for which statis-
tics are available.63 Whether one multiplies Oregon’s number by fifty 
states or one thousand, the resulting number does not approach 13 
million. The reasons for the small size of this number are not a mys-
tery: as I’ve already noted, there are a lot of diseases and different 
forms of suffering that do not qualify for legal DTOC because they 
don’t allow doctors to predict death within six months—either be-
cause the diseases are not predictable with that degree of precision or 
because they are not likely to result in death in a short time. There 
are many people who would not qualify for DTOC because they are 
too young (children and teenagers), too old (with age related demen-
tia), or because they are cognitively compromised in midlife. Further, 
the safeguards that require jumping through the hoops of identifying 
willing providers, talking to specialists, presenting for multiple visits, 
and enduring waiting periods, select for the insured, the well-
educated and the wealthy. Oregon’s experience bears this out.64   
The second reason that balancing the numbers in each 
community against each other doesn’t work is that concern for 
human dignity cuts both ways. Ultimately, it cannot be a numbers 
game. Proponents of legal DTOC are concerned for the dignity of 
those who are ready to die. However, the dignity of those who want 
to live and ask communities to judge them as having lives worthy of 
value, lives worthy of protection, rather than lives worthy of death, is 
no less important. 
IV. LOOKING FORWARD 
I have argued that it is harmful when the State rebrands death by 
labeling death at a time of one’s choosing a humane and dignified 
death. Neither concern for suffering nor concern for autonomy suf-
fices to justify legalizing DTOC. A state committed to the im-
portance of autonomy should not endorse the alienation of autonomy 
 
 63. Linda Ganzini, Legalized Physician-Assisted Death in Oregon, 16 QUT L. REV. 76, 
78 (2016). 
 64. Id. at 77–83. 
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that is ending one’s life early. Autonomy is important, but it should 
not be prioritized above everything else. It does not make sense for us 
to suppose that we have an obligation to stand helpless when a friend 
threatens his own life. Instead we take action, even interfering with 
his autonomy if necessary to protect our friend. Further, because of 
the harms to the vulnerable in our society, the State must act to pro-
tect those with disabilities and chronic pain by opposing DTOC. 
However, none of this means that we are excused from compas-
sion for those who feel ready to die and seek our help in doing it. We 
must not honor nor promote the dignity of those who are not yet 
ready to die by being callous to the concerns of those who are. To 
avoid pitting the dignity of either group against the other there are at 
least two things we can do to help: 1) transform our understanding of 
dignity into something more inclusive and meaningful and 2) im-
prove end of life care. 
Transforming our notions of dignity is imperative. It is when we 
understand lives of disability and suffering as merely bad that we label 
DTOC deaths as good. Our understanding of what dignity means is 
too narrow and our (mis-) understandings of disability box people in. 
Felicia Ackerman raises this concern by discussing the notion of a life 
with dignity: 
Timothy Quill [a well-known physician and proponent of DTOC] 
has suggested that “suicide could be appropriate for patients if they 
did not want to linger comatose, demented, or incontinent.” . . . 
This sort of thinking invites a flip reply: Haven’t Dr. Quill and his 
ilk ever heard of Depend[s]? To put the matter less flippantly, I 
think we need to question our society’s bigoted and superficial view 
of human dignity, which holds that the old, ill, and disabled have 
less human dignity than the young and strong. Does Dr. Quill real-
ly want to endorse the view that human dignity resides in the blad-
der and the rectum?65 
Ackerman is right. Properly understood, dignity doesn’t reflect con-
ditions we have no control over such as bladder control or whether 
we need assistance simply to walk across the room. Disability will be 
a part of most of our lives. We must teach each other and come to ac-
cept that at the right time, learning to be dependent with grace is 
strength. It is part of living and it is part of dying. True dignity is ev-
 
 65. Felicia Ackerman, Assisted Suicide, Terminal Illness, Severe Disability, and the 
Double Standard, in PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE: EXPANDING THE DEBATE 151 (Margaret 
P. Battin, Rosamond Rhode & Anita Silvers eds., 1998). 
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idenced by how we respond to conditions that we would not choose 
but cannot change. 
Second, it is crucial that we improve end-of-life care in our com-
munities. If as a community we care about end of life suffering, then 
we need to improve end of life care for the many, rather than giving 
the green light to end it all to the few who qualify, those who got sick 
with the diseases that happen to meet the criteria of the bill. We need 
to pour our resources into education and improving access to pallia-
tive care and hospice for all our citizens, so that both those who are 
ready to die and those who are not, those who are dying of ALS and 
of cancers both fast and slow, of kidney disease and of Alzheimer’s, all 
receive comfort and care at the end of life.  
 
